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INTRODUCTION 
If a physician told you that it was impossible to determine 
the sex of your child because the child’s genitalia had 
characteristics of a penis and a vagina, what would you do? 
Would you authorize the doctor to surgically construct a vagina 
or a phallus so that your child’s ambiguous genitalia could be 
“normal”? 
Many parents have no idea how to react or even accept the 
realization that their child is intersex—a naturally occurring 
biological phenomenon where a child is born with sex 
characteristics that do not conform to the traditional male or 
female definitions.1 Although intersex individuals occupy a 
marginalized status, they have recently received more public 
attention and have benefited from inclusion in the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) movement.2 Even though 
                                                                                                                            
1. See Intersex Definition, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://
www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/intersex (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) 
(defining intersex as “the condition of having characteristics intermediate between 
those of a male and a female”); see also What Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., 
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (defining 
intersex as a person “born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to 
fit the typical definitions of female or male”). The term “Disorder of Sexual 
Development” (“DSD”) also describes the conditions of genital ambiguity and has 
been used increasingly in medical and academic literature for scientific and ethical 
reasons. This Note, however, exclusively uses the term “intersex” to describe this 
phenomenon. 
2. See Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Initiative, GLOBAL RIGHTS, 
http://www.globalrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=wwd_initiatives_lgbti (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014) (describing the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 
(“LGBTI”) initiative launched in 2006 by human rights activists). While this Note uses 
the acronym “LGBT,” other acronyms can also be used to describe sexuality and 
gender identity-based communities such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
queer (“LGBTQ”). See Vicki L. Henry, Have No LGBTQ Clients? Think Again: What Every 
Attorney Representing Youth Needs to Know, BOS. B.J., Summer 2013, at 10 (using the 
acronym LGBTQ to describe a community of individuals who identify with genders and 
sexualities outside of societal norms). For a discussion on the progress of the intersex 
patient advocacy movement, see SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE 
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members of the intersex community can face different forms of 
discrimination than the LGBT community, they endure 
hardships similar to those experienced by LGBT persons, which 
allows for common advocacy goals.3 Intersex and transgender 
individuals can face common issues concerning their gender 
and sex, but the terms “intersex” and “transgender” are not 
interchangeable.4 While the term “intersex” refers to a 
biological phenomenon, “transgender” encompasses a spectrum 
of individuals’ self-identifications and gender expressions that 
do not match one’s assigned sex.5 The word “intersex” is also 
used in place of the antiquated term, “hermaphrodite,” which 
was commonly used to describe persons having reproductive 
organs of both the male and female sex up until the end of the 
twentieth century.6 
                                                                                                                            
CONTESTED SELF, 151 (2005) (describing the efforts of the Intersex Society of North 
America to influence the medical community in the early 2000s and the inclusion of 
prominent intersex speakers at notable medical conventions); see also Morgan Holmes, 
Deciding Fate or Protecting a Developing Autonomy? Intersex Children and the Colombian 
Constitutional Court, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 102, 103–05 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 
2006) (chronicling the status of intersex advocacy from its humble beginnings in the 
1990s to its rise in the public conscience in today’s social, academic, and medical 
environments). 
3. See generally JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CNT. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & 
NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011) (examining issues facing 
transgender individuals in the United States including those who identify as intersex); 
see also SILVAN AGIUS & CHRISTA TOBLER, EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRANS AND INTERSEX 
PEOPLE: DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF SEX, GENDER IDENTITY AND GENDER 
EXPRESSION (2012) (discussing EU law and its similar effect on transgender and 
intersex individuals). 
4. See GLAAD Media Reference Guide Transgender Glossary of Terms, GAY AND LESBIAN 
ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2013) (designating the term transgender as an “umbrella term for 
people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from the sex they were 
assigned at birth” while intersex describes “a person whose biological sex is 
ambiguous”). 
5. See id.; see also What’s the Difference Between Being Transgender or Transsexual and 
Having an Intersex Condition?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/
transgender (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (explaining that transgender individuals are 
born with typical female or male genitalia and experience an internal conflict between 
their gender identity and their biological sex while intersex individuals have physical sex 
characteristics that are ambiguous). 
6. JAMISON GREEN, INVESTIGATION INTO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE 63–64 (1994) (noting that “intersex” is a more appropriate 
term for persons with ambiguous or underdeveloped sex organs than the politically 
incorrect term “hermaphrodite”). 
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Historically, society has functioned upon the premise that 
there are two unambiguous sexes—male and female.7 Further, 
when children are born with ambiguous genitalia, the medical 
community has responded by surgically altering the intersex 
infant to fit into either the male or female sex category.8 So-
called genital-normalizing surgery, however, does not aim to 
disambiguate a child’s sex for reasons of medical necessity, but 
rather to allay parental concerns and preserve social norms by 
“fixing” genitalia that society has deemed “unacceptable.”9 
In the District of South Carolina, the complaint in M.C. v. 
Aaronson (“the Crawford case” or “Crawford”) recently 
introduced to the United States the legal, ethical, and medical 
issues regarding genital-normalizing surgery.10 Non-US tribunals, 
on the other hand, have already deemed this practice to be 
unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights.11 In fact, 
several countries have adopted methods outside the court 
system that promote intersex autonomy and exhibit changing 
social attitudes toward gender norms.12 These methods include a 
third gender category on government-issued documents such as 
birth certificates and passports, which directly challenges the 
custom of the male-female sex dichotomy that is the driving 
                                                                                                                            
7. See Julie A. Greenberg, The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem with Binary Sex 
Categories, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 51  (concluding that the law never 
recognized the need to define male or female until intersex issues became relevant 
during the turn of the twenty-first century); MORGAN HOLMES, INTERSEX: A PERILOUS 
DIFFERENCE 57–58 (2008) (discussing intersex issues within the sole context of male 
and female due to the social convention of acknowledging only two unequivocal sexes). 
8. See Greenberg, supra note 7, at 53 (explaining the practice of “fixing” infants’ 
ambiguous genitalia to conform to medically established norms); see also Anne Tamar-
Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 60 (2006) (mentioning genital-normalizing 
procedures which aim to allow intersex individuals to live “‘normal’” lives). 
9. See infra Part I.D (noting that the medical community sees ambiguous genitalia 
as a social emergency requiring immediate treatment rather than a diagnosis which 
needs medical attention). 
10. Complaint para. 46, M.C. v. Aaronson et al., (D.S.C. filed May 14, 2013) (No. 
2:13-cv-01303), 2013 WL 1961775 [hereinafter Crawford Complaint]. As of March 2014, 
this case is currently being litigated at the pre-trial level in federal court. 
11. See infra Part II.A–B (introducing the non-US decisions that concluded 
genital-normalizing surgery can deprive individuals of fundamental freedoms). 
12. See infra Part II.D (exploring the unique administrative approaches several 
nations have implemented to break away from traditional gender norms). 
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force behind genital-normalizing surgery.13 These evolving 
attitudes on sex and gender present legal theories that are 
directly applicable to the Crawford case.14 
This Note focuses on the practice of genital-normalizing 
surgery on intersex infants and its consequent deprivation of 
intersex individuals’ fundamental rights.15 Part I of this Note 
discusses the definitions and categories of intersex conditions 
and provides an overview of the history of sex assignment 
surgery. Part II discusses four non-US cases regarding forced sex 
assignment and examines the facts and claims of Crawford, the 
first lawsuit in the United States that seeks to redress the 
detrimental effects of genital-normalizing surgery and its 
deprivation of fundamental rights. Finally, Part III applies this 
non-US jurisprudence to Crawford to argue that genital-
normalizing surgery violates an individual’s constitutional right 
to liberty. 
I. IS IT A BOY OR A GIRL?: AN OVERVIEW OF 
INTERSEXUALITY 
Intersexuality is an extraordinary aspect of nature that 
presents medical, ethical, social, and legal considerations. This 
Part describes the biological characteristics and medical 
community’s reaction to intersexuality and introduces the first 
plaintiff in the United States to sue on issues relating to their 
intersex status. Part I.A provides a scientific background on 
intersexuality and its varying conditions. Part I.B then discusses 
the medical profession’s routine response to intersex infants 
and how physicians alter children’s ambiguous genitalia. Part I.C 
introduces Dr. John W. Money’s “John/Joan” case study and 
how it significantly influenced the medical profession in 
adopting genital-normalizing surgery to treat intersex infants. 
                                                                                                                            
13. See infra Part II.D (commenting on countries that have adopted a third gender 
option for government identity documents). 
14. See infra Part III (arguing that the non-US cases and unique approaches 
previously examined provide legal principles on genital-normalizing surgery that can 
influence the Crawford case). 
15. This Note uses the term “genital-normalizing surgery” and “sex assignment 
surgery” to refer to any procedure performed by a surgeon on an intersex individual or 
person with ambiguous genitalia for the purpose of making their genitals adhere to the 
traditional appearance of male or female anatomy. 
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Part I.D examines the policies of the American Academy of 
Pediatrics on disambiguating intersex infants’ genitalia. Finally, 
Part I.E tells the story of Max Beck, who suffered tragedies in 
adolescence and adulthood because of genital-normalizing 
surgery. 
A. Defining Intersex 
Intersex individuals have variations in sex characteristics, 
such as ambiguous external genitalia, ambiguous internal 
reproductive organs, or uncommon chromosomal patterns.16 
Examples of ambiguous external genitalia include “micropenis” 
(an unusually small penis), “cliteromegaly” (a significantly large 
clitoris), and “scrotalized labia” (a condition where external 
genitalia resemble labia and a scrotum).17 A chromosomal 
abnormality is any combination of chromosomes in an 
individual that is not XX, which denotes a biological female, or 
XY, which denotes a biological male.18 Examples of 
chromosomal abnormalities include XXY, known as Klinefelter 
syndrome, and X0, known as Turner syndrome.19 
                                                                                                                            
16. Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 63 (detailing the variations in anatomy of 
intersex individuals); see also RICARDO GONZALEZ & BARBARA M. LUDWIKOWSKI, 
HANDBOOK OF UROLOGICAL DISEASES IN CHILDREN 158 (2011) (providing a thorough 
description of male and female genital anomalies, such as micropenis, penile agenesis, 
hypospadias, and urogenital sinus). 
17. Kishka-Kamari Ford, “First, Do No Harm”—The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent 
to Genital Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 469, 470–71 
(2001) (specifying the myriad intersex conditions). For a detailed, scientific discussion 
on intersex medical conditions, see Julie Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: 
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278–92 
(1999) (providing a thorough background on the biological components of 
intersexuality). 
18. See Greenberg, supra note 17, at 278 (outlining human sex development from 
conception to birth and the deviations from typical chromosomal patterns); see also 
Dennis O’Neil, Sex Chromosome Abnormalities, anthro.palomar.edu/abnormal/ 
abnormal_5.htm (last visited Mar 24, 2014) (reviewing the most common chromosomal 
anomalies observed in the human population). 
19. See O’Neil, supra note 18. Men who have Klinefelter Syndrome inherit one or 
more additional X chromosomes and possess the chromosomal patterns XXY or XXXY. 
Id. Klinefelter Syndrome occurs in 1 of every 500–1000 male births and usually causes 
men to be slightly taller than average, have little to no body hair, and possess more 
feminine characteristics than men with a typical XY chromosomal pattern. Id. Turner 
Syndrome affects approximately one in 2000–5000 females. Id. Because women with 
Turner Syndrome have only one X chromosome, they usually develop a short stature, 
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Approximately 1 in 1500 births result in an intersex infant 
who has ambiguous genitalia requiring the attention of a 
medical expert specializing in sex differentiation.20 Medical 
research has shown it is possible that nearly two percent of all 
live births result in deviations from the “ideal male or female.”21 
Rather than accepting the notion that humans are not always 
completely male or female, society has attempted to reinforce 
strict sexual dimorphism by modifying those who threaten the 
legitimacy of the male-female sex binary.22 
B. History of Medical Responses to Intersex 
The customary medical response to intersex newborns has 
been to surgically alter the non-conforming genitalia to create a 
more “normal” penis or vagina—even if this means ignoring the 
infant’s biological sex, internal reproductive organs, 
chromosomal pattern, or likelihood of developing a certain 
gender identity.23 Traditionally, medical doctors have operated 
on boys born with an “inadequate” penis with the purpose of 
either making the genitalia appear “normal” as a male, or to 
make the child female by removing their phallus and 
                                                                                                                            
exceptionally small breasts, broad shoulders, and a propensity for thyroid disease, heart 
defects, and diabetes. Id. 
20. Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous Sex”—or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues 
in the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 1998, at 3, 26 
(visiting the issue of frequency of intersex individuals); see also How Common Is Intersex?, 
INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last visited Nov. 15, 
2013) (estimating that one in 1500 to 2000 live births result in intersex children but 
many more individuals have subtler atypical sex characteristics which can go unnoticed 
until adolescence). 
21. Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 
AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000) (distinguishing the frequency of intersex 
newborns as two percent of all live births from the frequency of newborns receiving 
genital-normalizing surgery as 0.2% of all live births); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 
63 (noting the approximate number of intersex births). 
22. Blackless et al., supra note 21, 161 (reflecting on society’s strict adherence to 
the assumption of two unambiguous sexes). 
23. Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 64 (referring to this medical response as the 
“concealment model” which encourages secrecy and denial of children’s intersex 
conditions); see Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 46 (suggesting that the 
likelihood of developing a certain gender identity can be determined because the 
plaintiff’s doctors noted “high testosterone levels” and significant prenatal 
“testosterone imprinting” as factors that might indicate the plaintiff’s ultimate gender 
identity). 
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constructing a vagina.24 Newborn girls who possess a clitoris that 
is deemed too large will undergo surgery to have their masculine 
genitalia shortened so that it is the “appropriate” size.25 
Unfortunately these surgical decisions rarely involve 
considerations of the child’s potential for sexual performance as 
an adult or their ability to have children.26 
The concept of assigning sex and gender via surgery has 
existed since the 1950s.27 In light of Dr. John W. Money’s 
notorious “John/Joan” case study, doctors began routinely 
performing genital-normalization procedures during the early 
1970s to resolve the “problem” of genitalia that do not clearly 
conform to the biological male or female sex.28 
C. The “John/Joan” Case Study 
In 1972, in his book Man & Woman, Boy & Girl, Dr. John 
W. Money of Johns Hopkins University published a study with 
the hypothesis that psychosexual development is not inherent to 
                                                                                                                            
24. Dreger, supra note 20, at 28 (detailing the practice of genital-normalizing 
procedures); see also Ford, supra note 17, at 471 (noting that an “adequate” penis of a 
newborn male measures at least 2.5 centimeters when stretched out); cf. Comm. on 
Genetics, Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 
106 PEDIATRICS 138, 139 (2000) (noting that medical attention is needed when a 
newborn male’s outstretched penis measures less than 2.0 centimeters). The Intersex 
Society of North America has created a “phall-o-meter” to serve as a visual 
representation of the arbitrary standards that determine sex. See PREVES, supra note 2, 
at 139, available at http://alicedreger.com/phallometer.html. 
25. Dreger, supra note 20, at 28; Ford, supra note 17, at 471 (noting that a clitoris 
is too large if it exceeds more than 1.0 centimeter at birth). 
26. Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at 139 (noting that genital-normalizing 
surgery is primarily concerned neither with adult orgasm potential nor fertility). But see 
Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 
PEDIATRICS 488, 490–91 (2006) (suggesting that fertility potential ought to play a role 
in making sex determinations for some intersex conditions, but medical treatment 
must assign a gender to all intersex individuals). 
27. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: 
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2–3 (2000) (discussing the origins of genital-normalizing 
surgery in the 1950s); see Dreger, supra note 20, at 27 (claiming that the notion of 
gender assignment became tenable around the 1910s). 
28. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 16 (observing that the publication of Dr. 
Money’s “John/Joan” study in pediatric literature established the contemporary 
medical model for treating intersexuality); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 64 (noting 
the normative underpinnings of Dr. Money’s theory found in the traditional and 
current medical treatment of intersexuality). 
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an individual but influenced by their surroundings.29 Essentially, 
Dr. Money hypothesized that an infant with anomalous sex 
characteristics could have his or her genitals surgically altered to 
conform to a strict appearance of male or female.30 He believed 
that this genital alteration, which is never revealed to the 
intersex individual, allows the child to develop a gender identity 
that matches the sex chosen by the surgeon.31 
Dr. Money’s study did not involve an intersex child but 
rather an infant named Bruce Reimer who was born biologically 
as a male and suffered severe trauma to his penis due to 
circumcision complications.32 In order to test his hypothesis, Dr. 
Money experimented with this tragedy and constructed female 
sex organs so Bruce could have normal-looking genitalia.33 Dr. 
Money convinced Mr. and Mrs. Reimer that Bruce could actually 
be raised as a girl with “normal” genitalia and therefore have a 
“normal” life.34 Under Dr. Money’s theory, it was imperative 
“that once the sex was decided on, doctors and parents never 
                                                                                                                            
29.  JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: THE 
DIFFERENTIATION AND DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION TO 
MATURITY (1972); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 60 (articulating Dr. Money’s theory 
that children do not necessarily develop gender identities that match their biological 
sex, but rather form gender identities that match the sex acknowledged by their family, 
peers, and medical professionals throughout childhood); see also Dreger, supra note 20, 
at 25 (asserting that this hypothesis also assumes that healthy psychosexual 
development depends on the appearance of genitalia). 
30. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17–18 (noting that this theory provided a 
convenient solution to a precarious circumstance); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, 
at 64 (characterizing Dr. Money’s theory as a way to mask the natural conditions of 
intersex children). 
31. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17–18 (emphasizing that physicians do not 
clarify whether genital-normalizing surgery aims to help intersex individuals accept 
their childhood or be comfortable with their gender in adulthood); see also Tamar-
Mattis, supra note 8, at 64 (highlighting secrecy as one of the central means to the 
desired gender identity under the “concealment model”). 
32. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 6 (introducing the story behind the 
“John/Joan” case); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 59–60 (reporting the causes of 
Bruce’s ambiguous genitalia). 
33. See John Colapinto, The True Story of John/Joan, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 11, 1997, 
at 54, 55–56 (explaining that after previous medical professionals concluded that Bruce 
could not have “normal heterosexual relations” as an adult due to his deformed penis, 
Bruce’s parents sought out Dr. Money upon learning of his expertise in gender 
transformation and psychology); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 59–60 (alleging 
that Dr. Money’s research was incomplete and omitted the actual results of the study). 
34. Colapinto, supra note 33, at 3 (recounting Dr. Money’s belief that children 
were born psychosexually neutral and therefore able to adapt to assigned genders). 
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waver in their decision, for fear of introducing dangerous 
ambiguities into the child’s mind.”35 In 1967, Mr. and Mrs. 
Reimer gave consent for genital-normalizing surgery on their 
son, and in less than a week they took home their “normalized” 
little girl, Brenda.36 
As time passed, Dr. Money reported Brenda Reimer’s 
outcome as an unequivocal success.37 This research led the 
medical community to adopt the theory that children are born 
psychosexually neutral and can adapt to the gender in which 
they are raised regardless of their biological sex.38 This theory 
serves as the rationale for genital-normalizing surgery on 
intersex children.39 Dr. Money’s reports on the “John/Joan” 
case, however, concealed the reality that the attempt to raise the 
biological male “Bruce” as the surgically and socially 
constructed female “Brenda” was, in fact, a complete failure.40 
The truth is that Bruce Reimer never accepted the sex forced 
upon him by his parents and physicians.41 He identified as a boy 
                                                                                                                            
35. Id. (noting that this concept assumed the younger the child was, the more 
psychosexually neutral they were). Dr. Money recommended that sex reassignment be 
completed as early as possible, preferably within the first thirty months of the child’s 
life. See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 64 (discussing the hypothesis that an early sex 
assignment strengthens the parent-child bond by providing the parents with a 
“normal” child as soon as possible). 
36. See Colapinto, supra note 33, at 3 (explaining that Bruce was renamed after his 
surgery and raised as “Brenda” throughout his childhood); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra 
note 8, at 60 (recalling the early stages of the “John/Joan” case). 
37. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17 (describing the omission of signs of 
Brenda’s rejection of female identity from the publishing of her story); See Tamar-
Mattis, supra note 8, at 60 n.7 (noting that this gender assignment surgery was reported 
as an achievement in the medical community). 
38. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17 (indicating the “John/Joan” case was 
widely disseminated in medical literature after its 1972 publication); see also Dreger, 
supra note 20, at 25 (commenting on the large scale reports of Dr. Money’s study). 
39. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17–18 (noting the predominant standard of 
care for genitalia that was ambiguous, deformed, and unable to fulfill sexual function 
was to surgically create genitalia which could have normal adult sexual function). 
Standard practice in genital-normalizing surgery favors female sex determinations over 
male, unless there is good reason to make the child male. See Int’l Library of Ethics, 
Law, and the New Med., ETHICS AND INTERSEX, 208, 212 (Sharon E. Sytsma ed., 2006) 
(observing that the majority of intersex patients receive a female genitoplasty diagnosis 
but the operation is generally unsuccessful). 
40. Colapinto, supra note 33, at 1 (describing the actual results of the 
“John/Joan” case study); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 61 (revealing that Dr. 
Money had lied about the successful transformation of Bruce to Brenda). 
41.  Colapinto, supra note 33, at 4–5; see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 60–61. 
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from early childhood, rejecting the idea that he was a girl.42 
Bruce ripped off the dresses his mother gave him, he urinated 
standing up, and he expressed virtually no feminine traits in his 
mannerisms and social behavior.43 
When Bruce was fourteen years old, his parents revealed 
the truth to him about his botched circumcision and sex 
reassignment.44 He immediately stopped wearing girls clothing 
and ceased his estrogen management.45 By the time Bruce was 
sixteen, he had his breasts removed, a phallus constructed to 
replace his previous surgically fashioned vagina, and changed 
his name from Brenda to David.46 Sadly, David Reimer 
ultimately committed suicide in May 2004 at age 38, finally 
succumbing to a lifelong struggle with depression.47 
Dr. Money’s influence on the standard of care for intersex 
individuals persisted for nearly three decades despite people 
learning the true results of the “John/Joan” case in the early 
1990s.48 As the intersex community became more visible in the 
early 2000s, the medical community began to recognize the 
                                                                                                                            
42. See Colapinto, supra note 33, at 4–5 (demonstrating that the little girl, Brenda, 
always wanted to be a boy); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 60–61 (quoting Bruce 
Reimer as saying he was “just a boy with long hair and girl’s clothes” to his 
psychologists during childhood). 
43. See Colapinto, supra note 33. at 6–7 (recounting Bruce’s childhood behavior as 
“Brenda” was boorish and he daydreamed of being a man with a mustache who owned 
a sports car); see also Dreger, supra note 20, at 25 
44. Colapinto, supra note 33at 7 (expressing that Bruce’s parents could no longer 
keep their son’s secret from him in good conscience); see Dreger, supra note 20, at 25 
(confirming that Bruce readopted his male status upon learning the truth at fourteen 
years old). 
45. Colapinto, supra note 33, at 8 (detailing Bruce’s reaction to learning that he 
was born male); see Tamar-Mattis supra note 8, at 61 (noting that Bruce began living as 
a boy immediately after he learned of his genital-normalizing surgery). 
46. Colapinto, supra note 33 at 8 (laying out the steps Bruce took to reclaim his 
male sex and gender); see Dreger, supra note 20, at 25 (observing that Bruce received 
several surgeries during his teenage years to become a man). 
47. John Colapinto, Gender Gap: What Were the Real Reasons Behind David Reimer’s 
Suicide?, SLATE, June 3, 2004, 3:58 PM, http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_
science/medical_examiner/2004/06/gender_gap.html (commenting on David 
Reimer’s psychological, financial, and marital problems); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 
8, at 61 (noting David’s choice to take his own life). 
48. See supra Part I.C (discussing the lasting impact of the “John/Joan” case study 
even though the medical community became aware that its findings were completely 
distorted). 
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intersex advocacy movement.49 The medical community in the 
United States started developing an approach to treating 
intersex individuals that shifted away from Dr. Money’s theory 
by focusing on more aspects of the situation, including the 
intersex individual.50 
D. Current Practice of Genital-Normalizing Surgery 
In 2000, the American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”) 
declared that a child with ambiguous genitalia is a “social 
emergency” and such a diagnosis “require[s] urgent medical 
attention.”51 The AAP directed medical professionals to inform 
parents that the child’s “abnormal appearance can be corrected 
and the child [could be] raised as a boy or a girl as 
appropriate.”52 This protocol embodies the flawed concept that 
immediate sex assignment is the optimal treatment for an 
intersex newborn because it promotes the unnecessary need to 
create genitalia that conform to the strict male-female binary 
and over-emphasizes allaying societal pressures and parental 
concerns.53 
The AAP modified its approach to genital-normalizing 
surgery on intersex infants in 2006.54 The new approach 
acknowledges that “[t]he birth of an intersex child prompts a 
long-term management strategy that involves myriad 
                                                                                                                            
49. See supra, note 2 and accompanying text (acknowledging the progress of the 
intersex advocacy movement in the healthcare context at the start of the new 
millennium). 
50. Compare Lee, supra note 26, at 488 (focusing on the interests of the parents and 
the intersex child as a single unit in conjunction with the advice of pediatric specialists), 
with Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at 138 (focusing on social concerns and solely 
on the needs of the intersex child’s parents). 
51.  Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at 138 (expressing the medical 
community’s primary opinion on and approach to intersexuality). 
52. Id. (stressing the importance of healthcare professionals being empathetic 
with and attentive to the parents’ anxieties and needs). 
53. Beh & Diamond, supra note 27, at 17 (recalling the psychosexual assumption 
that immediately choosing a sex for the child, altering the child’s genitalia to match 
that sex, and raising the child to identify with the gender of that sex, will result in a 
psychologically and socially stable development for the child); see Tamar-Mattis, supra 
note 8, at 71 (claiming that there is no scientific or medical study that shows physical or 
psychological benefits from genital-normalizing surgery). 
54. See Lee, supra note 26 at 488 (reporting that improvements in patient 
management, surgical techniques, and diagnosis methods have affected the way 
physicians treat intersex individuals). 
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professionals working with the family.”55 The AAP’s new 
consensus on treating children with intersex conditions suggests 
that “normalizing” the child is not an urgent decision, but a 
process that must consider psychological issues and recognize 
patient autonomy.56 Further, it represents the medical 
community’s retreat from the belief that a child’s psychosexual 
development is determined by the child’s genitalia and gender 
assigned by the child’s doctor and parents.57 Rather, the 2006 
approach recognizes that factors such as androgen exposure, 
brain structure, sex chromosomes, family dynamics, and social 
experiences influence a child’s psychosexual development.58 
Notwithstanding the advances reflected in this approach to 
intersexuality and intersex autonomy, Dr. Money’s theory still 
has clout in the medical community.59 
The 2006 AAP Consensus uses language that may appease 
intersex patient advocates by discussing the risk of “gender 
dissatisfaction” in adulthood, the essential need for “open 
communication with patients and family,” and the importance 
of preserving “erectile function and the innervation of the 
clitoris.”60 But, this language is unlikely to have more than a 
nominal impact on genital-normalizing procedures as the 
Consensus continues to direct doctors to rely on the 1996 AAP 
guidelines encouraging early reconstruction of genitals.61 These 
                                                                                                                            
55. Compare id. at 488 (focusing on the interests of the parents and the intersex child 
as a single unit in conjunction with the advice of pediatric specialists), with Comm. on 
Genetics, supra note 24, at 138 (focusing on social concerns and solely on the needs of 
the intersex child’s parents). 
56.  Lee, supra note 26, at 489–90 (using language that demonstrates a seemingly 
cautious approach to the treatment of intersex infants). 
57. Id. at 489 (providing a more comprehensive explanation and understanding 
of intersex conditions). 
58. Id. (defining “psychosexual development” as a concept composed of gender 
identity, gender role, and sexual orientation); cf. Comm. on Genetics, supra note 24, at 
138 (promoting the idea that the appearance of genitals and social upbringing are 
determinative of gender identity). 
59. See id. (emphasizing early genital-normalizing procedures on children with 
ambiguous genitalia). 
60. Id. at 489–91. 
61. Id. at 492 (suggesting that genital surgery for cosmetic reasons is unnecessary 
and ineffective at strengthening a parent’s bonds with his or her child, but nonetheless 
advocating for guidelines that encourage early surgery on intersex infants); see also 
Section on Urology, Timing of Elective Surgery on the Genitalia of Male Children with 
Particular Reference to the Risks, Benefits, and Psychological Effects of Surgery and Anesthesia, 
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1996 guidelines embrace the belief popularized by Dr. Money 
that children are psychosexually neutral at birth and that 
immediate treatment will create a “normal” life for the child.62 
Because physicians perform one hundred to two hundred 
genital-normalizing surgeries on infants each year, this 
contradictory protocol is relied upon by US surgeons, on 
average, two or more times every week.63 
E. Intersex Voices 
A significant portion of the intersex population is 
dissatisfied with the genital-normalizing surgery they were 
subjected to in early childhood and report psychological and 
sexual problems throughout adulthood.64 One intersex 
individual exhorts: “Wait for the babies to be able to say who 
they are. They are destroying lives, that’s what they are doing.”65 
                                                                                                                            
97 PEDIATRICS 590, 139 (1996) (advocating for immediate treatment that mimics the 
methods developed by Dr. Money’s “John/Joan” case study). 
62. See Section on Urology, supra note 61, at 139 (stating that “children whose 
genetic sexes are not clearly reflected in external genitalia (i.e., hermaphroditism) can 
be raised successfully as members of either sex if the process begins before the age of 2 
1/2 years”). 
63. Ford, supra note 17, at 469 (providing the frequency of intersex treatment that 
results in genital-normalizing procedures). 
64. The 2012 Köhler study found that forty-seven percent of intersex individuals 
were dissatisfied with their surgeries overall, and concluded that there should be a 
decrease in genital-normalizing procedures and such surgery should be performed only 
when the individual can give consent. See Birgit Köhler et al., Satisfaction with Genital 
Surgery and Sexual Life of Adults with XY Disorders of Sex Development: Results from the 
German Clinical Evaluation Study, J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM, Feb. 
2012, at 10-11. The 2004 Meyer-Bahlburg study, though, stated that only thirty-two 
percent of intersex adults are actually dissatisfied with their gender after having 
undergone genital-normalizing procedures as a child. See H. F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg et 
al., Attitudes of Adult 46, XY Intersex Persons to Clinical Management Policies, 171 J. Urology 
1615 (2004). The conclusions of the 2004 Meyer-Bahlburg study, however, were refuted 
by Morgan Holmes in her book Intersex: A Perilous Difference, discussed above. HOLMES, 
supra note 7, at 57–59. Holmes questioned the validity of the 2004 Meyer-Bahlburg 
study due to its inherent bias with weighting of questions, limited survey population, 
and insufficient data to create a diversified analysis of the survey population. Id.  
65. See McKenzie Martin, Living a Lie: Local Intersex Woman Shares Her Story, Nov. 
13, 2009, http://www.kktv.com/home/headlines/69933377.html (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013) (quoting Debbie Wuco, an intersex woman forced to live as a man due to genital-
normalizing surgery, as she speaks out against the practice of early sex assignment 
surgery and the psychological wounds it imposes); Stephanie Stevens, Living A Lie: An 
Intersex Woman Shares Her Story, YOUTUBE (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jbwR0inBd8s (broadcasting a local news segment featuring Debbie Wuco and 
her intersex story). 
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The destruction referred to is the mismatch between one’s 
gender identity and one’s sex.66 Early sex assignment surgery for 
intersex individuals also has been shown to create adult risks of 
sexual anxiety, impotence, minimal clitoral arousal, and overall 
dissatisfaction with one’s sex life.67 
As an example, genital-normalizing surgery greatly affected 
Max Beck, whose experience is not atypical.68 Max was born with 
a rudimentary phallus and a scrotalized labia.69 Doctors made 
the decision to remove Max’s phallus and make him into a 
female, and they instructed his parents to raise him as a girl.70 
Max became “Judy,” and as Max explained, Judy developed into 
a “rough-and-tumble tomboy” experiencing adolescence “with 
no physical sense of self” and as “a sort of sexual Frankenstein’s 
monster.”71 The doctors who managed Judy’s hormone 
treatment often told Max that he was an “unfinished” girl, and 
they performed a final vaginoplasty on Max during his teenage 
years.72 
                                                                                                                            
66. See Colapinto, supra note 33, at 8 (detailing the angst experienced by David 
Reimer from being forced to live as an anatomical girl from infancy while identifying 
with the male gender since childhood); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 68–69 
(highlighting the trauma faced by intersex individuals who unknowingly undergo a 
genital-normalizing procedure and develop a gender identity that does not match their 
sex). 
67. See Köhler, supra note 64 (observing markedly high rates of sexual problems in 
intersex individuals with desire, arousal, and painful intercourse); cf. Dreger, supra note 
20, at 29 (summarizing a study that suggests males with micropenis do not need to 
undergo genital-normalizing procedures to enjoy sexual function as an adult). 
68. See Max Beck, My Life as an Intersexual, Oct. 30, 2001, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/nova/body/intersexual-life.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (telling the story of 
an intersex individual made to live as a woman because of genital-normalizing surgery 
but who identified as a man in adulthood); see also Understanding the Gender Binary: How 
Does the Two-Gender System Impact You?, Challenge Sex Binary, GENEDERBINARY, http://
genderbinary.wikidot.com/challenge-sex-binary (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 
Challenge Sex Binary] (sharing Max Beck’s trauma and triumphs as an intersexual). 
69. Beck, supra note 68 (revealing Max’s psychological, physical, and emotional 
damage caused by his genital-normalizing surgery performed during infancy); see 
Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (noting Max’s intersex condition). 
70. Beck, supra note 68 (reviewing Max’s medical history); see Challenge Sex Binary, 
supra note 68 (discussing parental involvement in the sex assignment process). 
71. Beck, supra note 68 (providing an idea of how genital-normalizing procedures 
affect intersexual individuals); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (quoting Max Beck 
as he revisits his adolescence). 
72. Beck, supra note 68 (describing the medical treatment intersexual children 
must receive in order to maintain their assigned sex); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra 
note 68 (remembering Max’s teenage years). 
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In adulthood, Max identified as a lesbian because he had 
no reason to believe he was not a woman.73 Although Max felt 
empowered through identification with the lesbian community, 
his self-loathing continued, stemming from the realization that 
he could never be intimate with women because they would 
notice his disfigured genitalia.74 Max attempted suicide at the 
age of twenty-one and endured years of depression due to the 
disconnect between his psychological and corporal self.75  
Max discovered what had happened to him as an infant 
when his therapist obtained medical records revealing his 
intersex condition at birth.76 Max described himself as feeling 
like a “freak” and a “monster” as this revelation stripped him of 
his lesbian identity.77 Over time, Max became involved with the 
intersex community and decided to transition from female to 
male.78 He married Tamara Alexander in 2000, and identified as 
an intersexual male until his passing in 2008 from cancer.79 
                                                                                                                            
73. Beck, supra note 68 (illustrating the identity problems created by genital-
normalizing surgery); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (showing how keeping an 
intersex condition a secret from an individual can cause confusion and torment in 
regards to gender identity and sexuality). 
74. Beck, supra note 68 (detailing the physical and emotional harms associated 
with mismatching an individual’s sex and gender identity); see Challenge Sex Binary, 
supra note 68 (noting Max’s development of a sexual identity). 
75. Beck, supra note 68 (exposing the depth of Max’s personal struggle with his 
sexual and psychological identity); see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 
(acknowledging the dark side of genital-normalizing surgery on intersexuals). 
76. Beck, supra note 68 (explaining how Max came to learn of his true identity); 
see Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (reiterating that sex assignment surgeries are kept 
secret from intersex children even into adulthood). 
77. Beck, supra note 68 (noting the continued trauma Max experienced); see 
Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (noting Max’s intersex condition). 
78. Beck, supra note 68 (discussing Max’s personal decision to identify as an 
intersex individual and transition into the sex he felt most comfortable with); see 
Challenge Sex Binary, supra note 68 (reflecting a common intersex narrative where the 
individual transitions into their true gender in adulthood). 
79. Beck, supra note 68 (discussing Max’s adult life after coming into his identity 
as an intersexual); see Alice Dreger, Bye, Max. (We Already Miss You.), Feb. 4, 2008, 
http://alicedreger.com/Max.html (reminiscing Max’s life and discussing his lost battle 
with cancer). To read Max’s personal blog documenting his final months fighting 
cancer, see Max Beck, I am a Cancer Survivor, http://home.mindspring.com/~maxyxo/
index.html (reflecting back on his accomplishments, family, and goals, and detailing 
the struggles of receiving cancer treatment). 
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Although intersexuality is rare and not a new phenomenon, 
it still presents important social, medical, and legal issues.80 The 
theories that characterized the traditional approach to treating 
infants with ambiguous genitalia remain the primary reasons for 
the current practice of genital-normalizing surgery.81 Many 
individuals have undergone early sex assignment surgery, and 
the Crawford case in South Carolina addresses the present 
concerns created by altering children’s genitalia, such as 
medical ethics, individual autonomy, and reproductive rights.82 
II. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE & THE UNITED 
STATES’ COMMENCING CASE ON INTERSEX ISSUES 
There are only a handful of legal decisions in the world that 
involve sex assignment surgery and intersex issues.83 Part II.A 
summarizes the 1995 and 1999 Colombian court decisions, 
which established the unprecedented protection of intersex 
minors from parental consent to genital-normalizing surgeries. 
Part II.B then examines Germany’s 2007 Völling decision, which 
parallels the holdings of the Colombian cases. Part II.C 
introduces the facts and legal claims of the groundbreaking 
intersex lawsuit in the United States, the Crawford case. Lastly, 
Part II.D concludes by discussing several alternative public policy 
options administered by various nations that promote the rights 
of intersex individuals. 
A. The Constitutional Court of Colombia 
Throughout the 1990s, Colombia issued landmark rulings 
in cases regarding sex assignment surgery and intersex 
                                                                                                                            
80. See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text (discussing the AAP’s conflicting 
medical guidelines and the social and sexual problems faced by intersex individuals 
who receive genital-normalizing surgery). 
81. See supra, notes 58–62 and accompanying text (revealing that the flawed 
theory that initially caused physicians to regularly perform genital-normalizing surgery 
lingers in AAP guidelines). 
82. See supra Part I.E (presenting intersex narratives). 
83. See Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 41, 49 
(2004) (noting that Colombia is the only country in the world to have addressed the 
medical treatment of intersex infants through its judiciary); see also Julie A. Greenberg 
& Cheryl Chase, Background of Colombia Decisions, Intersex SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://
www.isna.org/node/21 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (discussing the consequences of the 
unique 1995 and 1999 Colombian decisions). 
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children.84 The first of these cases, The Decision of Y.Y., had 
broad implications for intersex autonomy and protected all 
individuals from any genital-normalizing procedure.85 Four years 
later, The Decision of X.X. narrowed this broad protection to only 
apply to intersex minors capable of making medical decisions 
for themselves.86 In the same year the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia, in The Decision of N.N., clarified what information 
doctors must disclose to parents to ensure they are able to give 
informed consent to genital-normalizing surgery on their 
intersex children, who, due to their young age, cannot make 
competent medical decisions.87 
1. The Decision of Y.Y. 
In 1995, the Constitutional Court of Colombia became the 
first tribunal to issue a decision on the rights of an intersex 
                                                                                                                            
84. See Haas, supra note 83, at 43 (contrasting the fact that the United States has 
not seen a case involving genital-normalizing surgery with Colombia, which has decided 
multiple cases regarding intersex issues and sex assignment procedures); see also 
Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (recognizing the historical significance of 
Colombia’s rulings). 
85. See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 
1995, Sentencia T-477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.)  
(holding that only the individual can consent to a surgery that determines his or her 
gender regardless of the individual’s age); see also Haas, supra note 83, (articulating the 
Court’s ruling in The Decision of Y.Y., which requires the patient’s own informed 
consent for genital-normalizing procedures). 
86. See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU-
337/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.) (holding that parents 
cannot consent to sex assignment surgery on an intersex child who can make 
competent medical decisions but can under certain circumstances give consent for 
intersex children too young to consent to medical procedures); see also Greenberg & 
Chase, supra note 83 (interpreting The Decision of X.X. to allow parental informed 
consent to genital-normalizing surgery depending on the urgency of the surgery, 
riskiness of the surgery, and the autonomy of the child). 
87. See Haas, supra note 83, at 52 (explaining that The Decision of N.N. required a 
heightened standard of parental informed consent); The Court, CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT OF COLOMBIA, http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/lacorte/(last visited Nov. 
20, 2013) (explaining that the Constitutional Court of Colombia is the highest entity in 
the nation’s judicial branch and serves to safeguard the integrity and supremacy of the 
Colombian Constitution). See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional 
Court], Sentencia T-551/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.) 
(holding that parental informed consent must encompass a knowledge of intersex 
conditions and alternative treatment options among other things). 
2014] PREFERRED PRIVATE PARTS 795 
plaintiff.88 In The Decision of Y.Y., a teenage boy, whose name was 
not identified, filed suit against the physicians who operated on 
him as an infant.89 Like David Reimer in the “John/Joan” case, a 
botched circumcision had left the plaintiff with a deformed 
penis.90 His parents, therefore, had consented to “any treatment 
that would improve their son’s situation including a sex 
change.”91 On April 21, 1981, doctors had operated on the 
plaintiff to “correct” his traumatized penis by changing his sex 
and giving him “normal” female parts.92 
The goal of the surgery had been to provide the child with 
the opportunity to have sexual intercourse as an adult and 
thereby live a “normal” life.93 Just like David Reimer, the 
plaintiff never developed a female gender identity and 
experienced significant emotional trauma from being forced to 
live in a sexual identity chosen for him.94 He grew up constantly 
questioning his sexual identity and felt anguished living as a 
female.95 As a teenager, upon learning of the surgery performed 
on him as a child, the plaintiff sued the hospital and the 
physicians who performed the surgery.96 
                                                                                                                            
88. See Kate Haas, supra note 83, at 49 (2004) (framing the timeline of Colombia’s 
decisions on genital-normalizing surgery); see also Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 
(discussing the significance of this landmark ruling). 
89. See Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85 
(withholding the name of the plaintiff in order to protect his identity); see also 
Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (identifying the plaintiff without disclosing his 
name). 
90.  Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 1.2 
(reviewing the physical history of the plaintiff’s genitalia); see also Haas, supra note 83, 
at 49 (noting the plaintiff was accidentally castrated during circumcision). 
91. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 1.2 
(translated by author) (demonstrating the parents’ fears and desire to “correct” their 
son’s genitalia at any cost). 
92. Id. (translated by author) (summarizing the decision to make Y.Y. a female). 
93. Id. (translated by author) (discussing the plaintiff’s genital-normalizing 
surgery); Haas, supra note 83, at 94 (explaining the goals of the sex assignment 
surgery). 
94.  Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 5.1 
(detailing the plaintiff’s psychological struggles exhibited by his alarming behavior 
when others treated him as a female). 
95. Id. at 5.1 (noting that the plaintiff often felt isolated, confused, and depressed 
because of the mismatch between his gender identity and sex). 
96. See id. at 2 (pointing out the plaintiff’s desire to be remedied for the harm 
caused by the sex assignment surgery). 
796 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:777 
The Constitutional Court of Colombia held that the doctors 
violated Y.Y.’s constitutional rights by performing genital-
normalizing surgery.97 More specifically, the Court held the 
physicians liable for violating the minor’s constitutional right to 
identity.98 The decision described this right to identity as “part 
of human dignity.”99 The Court also held that each individual 
holds individual rights closely related to one’s autonomy.100 The 
Court reasoned that autonomy allows for self-determination, 
which in turn allows the individual to develop their identity 
freely.101 
Citing to Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Court emphasized the State’s role in 
protecting the identity of children.102 The Court focused on the 
Convention’s principle that a State must “provid[e] appropriate 
assistance” to children who have been illegally deprived of their 
                                                                                                                            
97. Id. at 8 (characterizing the procedure as a deprivation of the plaintiff’s 
fundamental rights to identity and autonomy). 
98. Id. (asserting the fundamental rights at stake are an individual’s right to 
identity and dignity); see Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (discussing the rights to 
develop one’s own personality and to define one’s sexuality as aspects of one’s right to 
identity). 
99. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 15.1 
(translated by author) (depicting a circular chain of fundamental rights by reasoning 
that human dignity encompasses the right to identity). 
100. Id. (articulating that the right to identity bestows rights affecting one’s 
autonomy, which protects the right to self-determination, which allows one to develop 
one’s personhood – or one’s identity and in essence part of one’s human dignity). 
101. Id. (discussing freedoms that inherently allow for individuals to exercise their 
fundamental rights). 
102. Id. at 11 (relying on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child to stress 
the importance of developing one’s individual identity and the duty of the State to 
protect a child’s autonomy). Article Eight of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child states: 
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or 
her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by 
law without unlawful interference.      
 2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or 
her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and 
protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 8, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 
44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. doc A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child], available at http://www.ohchr.org/, 
EN/Professional Interest/Pages/CRC.aspx. 
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identity, and declared that the physicians had violated Y.Y.’s 
rights.103 
The Court further held that sex operations, without 
consent, violate an individual’s right to develop his/her own 
sexual identity.104 The Decision of Y.Y., therefore, established that 
only the individual on whom gender assignment surgery will be 
performed can give consent to the surgery, regardless of the age 
of the individual.105 As a result, this case established a 
moratorium in Colombia on the practice of genital-normalizing 
surgery on infants and young children until they are old enough 
to consent to surgery on their own.106 
2. The Decision of X.X. 
In the aftermath of The Decision of Y.Y., the Colombian 
Constitutional Court issued two rulings in 1999 involving 
intersex children—The Decision of X.X. and The Decision of N.N.107 
Both teams of doctors in these cases had initially planned to 
perform genital-normalizing operations during infancy, but 
                                                                                                                            
103. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 18.1 
(translated by author) (upholding Colombia’s ratification of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child as binding law). 
104. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85, at 15.1 
(recognizing that sexual identity is an autonomous decision that is a part of one’s 
fundamental right to develop their identity). 
105. Id. at 15 (holding that all persons must be allowed to decide for themselves 
whether they want to alter their sex or keep their natural genitalia). 
106. See Haas, supra note 83, at 99 (observing that after The Decision of Y.Y., 
physicians still offered genital-normalizing surgery as a treatment method, but they 
would not perform these surgeries on children with ambiguous genitalia even with 
consenting parents); see also Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (noting that physicians 
mentioned genital-normalizing surgery with parents as a treatment option for intersex 
infants but would not use this treatment because of The Decision of Y.Y.). 
107.  See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia 
SU-337/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); Corte Constitucional 
[C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia T-551/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional 
[G.C.C.] (Colom.). The Constitutional Court of Colombia refers to the children as the 
minor “X.X.” and the minor “N.N.” in order to protect their identity. When the court 
delivered these decisions, both of the children had already begun to develop a female 
gender identity, and the court uses feminine pronouns when referring to the minors 
throughout the opinions. This Note also uses female pronouns when referring to the 
minors in these cases to respect their gender identities. For an English translation of 
the Court’s opinion in The Decision of X.X., see The Rights of Intersexed Infants and 
Children: Decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court, Bogota, Colombia, 12 May 1999 
(Nohemy Solórzano-Thompson trans.), in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 122–
38 [hereinafter Translation of the X.X. Decision]. 
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then made the decision to postpone the surgeries until the 
children became older and had developed gender identities.108 
Although the parents were pressuring the physicians to perform 
genital-normalizing surgery, the physicians refused to operate 
on children who could not consent in accordance with the 
Court’s 1995 holding in The Decision of Y.Y.109 
In May 1999, the Court, in The Decision of X.X., held that a 
parent’s decision to subject their children to genital-normalizing 
surgery violates constitutional rights guaranteed to children and 
the State by the Colombian Constitution.110 The Court relied 
heavily on Article 18 of The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which encourages countries to ensure that 
parental actions take into account the best interests of their 
children.111 The decision balanced a parent’s right to make 
decisions on behalf of their child with a child’s right to be 
emancipated from parental decisions that are not in the best 
interests of the child.112 By declaring that children “possess their 
own individuality and dignity, and constitute a developing 
autonomy,” the Court created a basis for establishing legal rights 
for intersex children from the potential harms of a procedure 
that permanently alters their genitalia.113 
                                                                                                                            
108. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86 
(observing Colombian physicians’ decisions in accordance with The Decision of Y.Y.). 
Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 122 (describing the background for 
The Decision of X.X.). 
109. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86 (expressing 
the possible prejudice of X.X.’s parents in forcing their child to have their genitals 
altered). 
110. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 71, 77 
(declaring that the Article 44 of the Colombian Constitution confers an obligation to 
the State and society “to assist and protect the child in order in order to guarantee 
their harmonious and complete development and the full exercise of their rights”). 
111. Id. at 68, 77 (utilizing the text from the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child to hold the State to a higher standard of protecting minors). 
112. Id. at 68 (acknowledging the parent’s constitutional right to control their 
home with the State’s obligation to ensure parents act upon the best interest of the 
child); see Holmes, supra note 2, at 108 (suggesting that children should be liberated 
from their parents the more the parents or guardians express prejudice towards their 
child or an inability to understand their child’s situation). 
113. Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123; see Constitutional 
Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 68 (asserting that children are not 
simply the property of their parents and must have their best interests considered); see 
also Holmes, supra note 2, at 108, 111 (interpreting the Court’s use of “developing 
autonomy” as valuing the autonomy and future well-being of the child). Holmes notes 
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The Decision of X.X. describes genital-normalizing surgery as 
lacking urgency, risky, invasive, and ambivalent to health.114 The 
Court also recognized that parents are often unable to 
comprehend the idea of genital ambiguity and can be blinded 
by their own fears and prejudices.115 This inevitably results in a 
decision to normalize the child as quickly as possible without a 
true concern for the best interests of the child.116 When parents 
discover their child has ambiguous genitalia, medical 
professionals and parents undermine true informed consent by 
assuming that having the child’s genitals “fixed” is in the best 
interests of the child.117 The Court introduced the idea of a 
heightened standard for informed consent by declaring that 
valid informed consent given by parents must be “qualified and 
persistent.”118 The Court, however, failed to articulate the 
meaning of “qualified and persistent” informed consent.119 
The State’s interest in protecting the child’s best interests 
ultimately became the justification for denying the mother’s 
                                                                                                                            
that the Court’s use of the language “a developing autonomy” does not imply that 
children are completely independent from their parents, but rather should be afforded 
freedom from their parents in certain circumstances. 
114. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123–24; see also 
Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 68 (expressing that 
genital-normalizing surgery is not urgent for any medical reason and provides no 
health benefits to the child). 
115. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 79 
(alleging that parental opinions on genital ambiguity are rarely developed free from 
the influence of outside sources). 
116. See id. (contending that parents with intersex children endure severe trauma 
from not understanding their child’s condition, desperately wanting to normalize the 
child, and because our society does not openly discuss issues such as 
“hermaphroditism”); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 87. (noting that culturally-
biased recommendations and medical professionals acting outside of their expertise 
contribute to a decision that does not concern the best interests of the child). 
117. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 79 
(conjecturing that infants with ambiguous genitalia are perhaps subjected to 
discrimination from their own parents); see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 86 (noting 
that genital-normalizing surgery is often presented to parents by doctors in a way that 
suggests the procedure is a foregone conclusion). 
118. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 131; see also 
Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 83 (mentioning the 
concept of “qualified and persistent” consent in the context of parental informed 
consent for genital-normalizing procedures). 
119. See Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 19 
(translated by author) (stating that the Court in The Decision of X.X. did not discuss the 
definition or requirements of “qualified and persistent” parental informed consent 
because X.X.’s mother could not consent on her behalf under any circumstances). 
800 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:777 
request for an order to disambiguate X.X.’s genitalia.120 
Granting protection to the intersex minor, X.X., the 
Constitutional Court stated, “it is the minor who should decide 
on her gender identity  . . . [T]he Court will protect the minor’s 
right to freely develop her identity and equality . . . .”121 This 
decision offers legal recognition of an intersex child’s autonomy 
and identity and acknowledges the potential inadequacies of 
parental consent as authorization for sex assignment surgery on 
intersex children.122 
3. The Decision of N.N. 
Three months after The Decision of X.X., the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia maintained the autonomy of an intersex 
child in The Decision of N.N.123 In this case, N.N. was a two-year-
old intersex child unable to give competent medical consent.124 
According to The Decision of X.X., parents could give permission 
for the normalization of their child’s genitals as long as the 
informed consent was “qualified and persistent.”125 The Court 
failed to articulate this standard in The Decision of X.X., but it did 
so in The Decision of N.N.126 The N.N. Court declared that 
“qualified and persistent” consent exists when parents are given 
                                                                                                                            
120. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 77 
(upholding the State’s duty under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
order to protect the best interests of the child). 
121. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 136 (explaining why the 
mother’s request for her daughter’s surgery was denied). 
122. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86, at 79, 89 
(advocating for the rights of the minor who had not consented to surgery while 
questioning the intentions of the parent’s desire to disambiguate their child’s 
genitalia). See also Holmes, supra note 2, at 103 (concluding that the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia suggested intersex children are entitled to special protection from 
prejudice and parental consent that does not concern the best interests of the child). 
123. See Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87 (denying 
the parent’s petition for genital-normalizing surgery to be performed on the child). 
124. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, 15 (disclosing 
the age of the intersex minor). 
125. Id. at 15 (addressing the Court’s previous ruling in The Decision of X.X. that 
articulated “qualified and persistent” consent); see Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra 
note 107, at 130–31 (reconciling the parent’s and child’s rights to achieve an 
equilibrium that creates a consensual decision which considers the best interests of the 
child). 
126. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 22 
(announcing the “qualified and persistent” consent standard because N.N. could not 
give competent medical consent, therefore her parents could have consented for her). 
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detailed information about the advantages and disadvantages of 
surgically altering their child’s genitalia, are allowed ample 
periods of time to consider the alternatives to genital-
normalizing surgery, and make decisions in consideration of 
their child’s best interests.127 
In The Decision of N.N., “qualified and persistent” consent 
did not exist because N.N.’s parents were led to believe that 
genital-normalizing surgery was the only option for their 
daughter.128 The parents did not examine alternative options to 
surgery; therefore, their decision did not consider the best 
interests of the child.129 This decision promotes the autonomy of 
intersex individuals by valuing the child’s fundamental right to 
sexual identity over parents’ and doctors’ genital preferences.130 
The Decision of N.N. requires a heightened standard of informed 
consent and serves as precedent for Colombian families making 
decisions regarding children with intersex conditions who 
cannot make medical decisions for themselves.131 Further, the 
Court promotes diversity by making a place for intersex 
individuals in society.132 As stated in the conclusion of the 
opinion, “it is the duty of all of us to listen to these people and 
not only to learn to live with them but to learn from them.”133 
                                                                                                                            
127. Id. (translated by author) (outlining the new standard of informed consent 
for genital-normalizing surgery on infants); see also Haas, supra note 83, at 53 (noting 
that “qualified and persistent” consent truly concerns the best interests of the child). 
128. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 29–30 
(deciding that the parent’s consent was invalid because they were not provided with 
adequate information). 
129. Id. (applying a strict application of the “qualified and persistent” rule). Haas, 
supra note 83, at 52–53 (reiterating the invalid parental consent for N.N. because of the 
lack of comprehension as to the implications of such a surgery). 
130. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 10 
(requiring a very high standard of informed consent so that the child’s autonomy is 
protected). 
131. Greenberg & Chase, supra note 83 (concluding that The Decision of N.N. 
forces parents in Colombia to be informed of accurate information, germane risks, and 
alternative options for sex assignment surgery). But see Haas, supra note 83 (concluding 
The Decision of N.N. weakens the holding of the decision in The Decision of X.X. by 
making clear only children five years of age or older can escape parental “qualified and 
persistent” consent to genital-normalizing surgery). 
132. Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87, at 30 
(recognizing that intersex autonomy is more important than the preservation of 
gender norms). 
133. Id. (translated by author) (quoting Dr. William Reiner to emphasize the 
importance of diversity in society and of understanding marginalized communities). 
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In sum, the Constitutional Court of Colombia in The 
Decision of Y.Y. concluded that doctors may not perform sex 
assignment surgery on any individual unless there is consent.134 
Four years later, the Court in The Decision of X.X. retreated from 
this broad holding by declaring that parents can give consent for 
children who are not old enough to make competent decisions 
as long as the consent is “qualified and persistent.”135 The 
Decision of N.N. then affirmed The Decision of X.X. by holding that 
parents can only give consent to genital-normalizing surgery for 
children too young to make medical decisions and outlined the 
requirements for “qualified and persistent” parental consent.136 
B. The Cologne Regional Court of Germany 
In 2008, Germany’s Cologne Regional Court decided 
Völling, a case involving an operation that determined the sex of 
Christiane Völling without her consent.137 The Völling decision 
recognized the social and legal consequences of the surgeon’s 
actions on Christiane Völling.138 Christiane Völling had been 
born with ambiguous genitalia yet had been raised as a boy.139 
                                                                                                                            
Dr. Reiner is physician in the Division of Pediatric Urology and the Division of Child 
Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University. He is also a professor of Pediatrics at the 
University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center specializing in intersex conditions. 
Ethics of Gender Assignment, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/–library/–
reinerprecepts (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (providing biographies of prominent intersex 
advocates in the United States). 
134. See Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.), supra note 85 (declaring 
that only the individual himself can give consent to a medical procedure that 
determines that individual’s sex or gender). 
135. See Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), supra note 86 (holding 
that an eight-year-old child deserves protection from the potential harms of parental 
consent to genital-normalizing surgery). 
136. See Constitutional Court, Case T-551/99, (Colom.), supra note 87 
(concluding that parents cannot give the requisite “qualified and persistent” consent 
necessary for assigning a sex to their two-year-old child without being informed of 
alternative intersex treatment options). 
137. See generally Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07, 
06.02.2008 (holding that a surgeon violated the plaintiff’s fundamental rights to self-
determination and to bodily integrity by removing the plaintiff’s sex organs without her 
consent). 
138. See id. at 2 (noting that not only did the defendant’s actions deny the 
plaintiff’s right to self-determination, but they also compromised her health and 
influenced aspects of her adult life such as gender identity). 
139. German Gender-Assignment Case Has Intersexuals Hopeful, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.dw.de/german-gender-assignment-case-has-intersexuals-
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When Christiane was eighteen years old, a physician discovered 
her complete female internal reproductive organs during a 
routine appendectomy.140 Instead of informing Ms. Völling of 
the discovery, the surgeon removed her uterus and ovaries 
without her consent and did not tell her of the procedure.141 
This operation permanently removed her ability to reproduce as 
a female and produce estrogen.142 Thirty years after the 
operation, Christiane successfully sued the physician for 
removing her female reproductive organs without her 
consent.143 
The Cologne Regional Court found that by removing 
Christiane’s ovaries, the surgeon denied her the ability to 
produce her own sex hormones, to attain a life as a woman, to 
self-identify as a woman, to experience a female sexuality, and to 
attempt to procreate as a woman.144 As such, the physician had 
“culpably violated her health and self-determination.”145 This 
ruling recognizes that a surgical procedure that determines 
one’s sex not only affects one’s physical health, but also is 
inherently tied to that person’s autonomy—or right to self-
determination.146 The Court found Ms. Völling’s doctor liable 
                                                                                                                            
hopeful/a-3000902-1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (revealing that a midwife believed 
Christiane’s clitoris was actually a penis); see AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 
(explaining that Christiane Völling was raised as a boy). 
140.  AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (observing that Christiane had 
identified as male since birth); see Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), 
supra note 137 (noting that Christiane had a fully formed uterus and ovaries). 
141. See Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137 
(indicating that the surgeon removed Christiane’s female reproductive organs upon 
their discovery without consulting other medical professionals). 
142. Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137 (claiming 
that this action’s permanence constituted a violation of the plaintiff’s fundamental 
freedoms). AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (indicating that the physician deprived 
Christiane of her opportunity to bear a child). 
143. See Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137 (ruling 
in favor of the plaintiff); see also AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (explaining that 
Christiane did not discover she was intersex until she received a pamphlet on 
intersexuality in 2006). Thereafter, she learned of her physician’s actions and filed suit 
against the physician the following year. Id. 
144. Cologne District Court, Case 25 O 179/07, (Ger.), supra note 137 (spelling 
out the future consequences of the surgeon’s actions). 
145. Id. (translation on file with author) (commenting on the recklessness of the 
procedure and its preclusion of allowing Christiane to make important life decisions). 
146. Id. (explaining that when the doctor removed Völling’s ovaries, he took away 
her means to live naturally as a woman and develop a female sexuality directly violating 
her self-determination). 
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for violating her health and right to self-determination, 
awarding her EU€100,000 in damages and the costs of 
litigation.147 
C. The Self-Determination Doctrine in the United States 
The right to self-determination is a common law concept in 
the United States that recognizes that “sanctity of individual free 
choice and self-determination are fundamental constituents of 
life.”148 This safeguards “an individual’s strong personal interest 
in directing the course of his own life . . . [and] an individual’s 
right to behave and act as he deems fit, provided that such 
behavior and activity do not conflict with the precepts of 
society.”149 Most importantly, the right to self-determination 
establishes that “the value of life may be lessened rather than 
increased by the failure to allow a competent human being the 
right of choice.”150 The right to self-determination is so 
completely intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of 
liberty that courts recognize that individuals are protected from 
bodily intrusions that conflict with the interests protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.151 
                                                                                                                            
147. Id. 
148. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223–24 (N.J. 1985) (holding that a 
gastronasal feeding tube can be removed from an invalid nursing home resident if the 
life-saving medical treatment is against the patient’s wishes or withholding the life-
sustaining treatment is in their best interests); see also Marguerite Anne Chapman, The 
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Too Little, Too Late?, 42 ARK. L. REV. 319, 324 
(1989) (characterizing the right to self-determination as “the right to decide what will 
or what will not be done to one’s body”). 
149. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 453 (N.J. 1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985)) (declaring that the objective of 
judicial action in medical treatment decisions is to preserve the patient’s right to self-
determination). 
150. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224. 
151. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287–88 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (articulating that the liberty interest results from 
individuals making decisions regarding the State’s invasions of the body). See e.g., 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (holding that the State cannot surgically 
intrude one’s body to recover criminal evidence because it violates that individual’s 
right to privacy and security); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) 
(concluding that forcibly retrieving contents swallowed by an individual violates his due 
process of law). 
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D. The Crawford Case 
The Crawford case is a case of first impression in the United 
States, as M.C. is the first intersex plaintiff to assert 
constitutional claims in a federal court against a defendant for 
performing genital-normalizing surgery.152 Crawford is currently 
being litigated in the US District Court for the District of South 
Carolina.153 As of March 2014, the parties are engaging in 
discovery and preparing to file motions for summary 
judgment.154 
On May 14, 2013, an eight-year-old plaintiff, M.C., filed a 
complaint by and through his parents, Pamela and Mark 
Crawford.155 The complaint alleged that the doctors who 
performed genital-normalizing surgery on him when he was 
sixteen months old violated his constitutional rights.156 This is 
the first cause of action in the United States that seeks legal 
redress for the harm caused by genital-normalizing surgery 
performed on an intersex infant.157 
                                                                                                                            
152. See generally Crawford Complaint, supra note 10 (alleging that a sex assignment 
operation deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights to liberty, privacy, and 
bodily integrity); see also Haas, supra note 83 (noting that many countries across the 
world including the United States have not addressed intersex issues in the court 
system). 
153. See generally Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 
2:13CV01303 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Crawford Order] (granting plaintiff’s 
motion for expedited discovery upon denying defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
154. See Docket Proceedings, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13CV01303 (D.S.C. 2013) 
(showing various motions from the parties but no motion for summary judgment). 
155. See Crawford Order, supra note 153 (using “M.C.” to protect the minor’s 
identity and indicating the plaintiff brought this cause of action through his parents). 
156. See id. (including the rights to bodily integrity, privacy, procreation, and 
liberty). M.C. also filed a cause of action against his physicians in South Carolina’s 
County of Richland Court of Common Pleas alleging gross negligence and medical 
malpractice based on lack of informed consent. While this Note discusses the doctrine 
of informed consent in the context of genital-normalizing surgery, it will not analyze 
M.C.’s state claims but rather focus on its relationship to his federal constitutional 
claims. See Colleen Jenkins, Couple Sues Over Adopted Son’s Sex-Assignment Surgery, 
WESTLAW J. MED. MALPRACTICE 4, May 23, 2013, at *1–2 (discussing the M.C. v. 
Aaronson lawsuit and its current proceedings). 
157. See Groundbreaking SPLC Lawsuit Accuses South Carolina, Doctors and Hospitals of 
Unnecessary Surgery on Infant, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/news/groundbreaking-splc-lawsuit-accuses-south-carolina-doctors-and-
hospitals-of-uN.N.ece (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). The Southern Poverty Law Center 
filed this lawsuit on behalf of M.C., naming Greenville Hospital System, Medical 
University of South Carolina, and individual employees as defendants. 
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M.C. was born prematurely in December 2004 with both 
male and female internal reproductive organs—known as a 
“true hermaphroditism.”158 Doctors initially identified M.C. as a 
male based on the overall physical appearance of his genitalia 
but concluded that M.C. could develop normally whether he was 
raised as a boy or a girl.159 M.C.’s biological parents had given up 
their parental rights by putting him up for adoption shortly after 
he was released from the hospital, and the South Carolina 
Department of Social Services (“SCDSS”) had taken custody of 
M.C. on February 16, 2005.160 The SCDSS had maintained 
custody and the right to make decisions regarding medical 
treatment for M.C. until his adoptive parents gained custody on 
December 11, 2006.161 
While the SCDSS had custody of M.C., doctors at the 
Medical University of South Carolina routinely examined M.C. 
to determine his sex.162 On April 26, 2005, a doctor observed 
that one of M.C.’s gonads resembled an ovary and the other 
resembled a testis.163 After months of testing and examinations, 
M.C.’s primary physicians were unable to make a conclusive 
determination of whether M.C. was male or female.164 In January 
2006, M.C.’s doctors concluded in their medical records that sex 
assignment surgery was neither urgent nor necessary and that 
M.C. had the potential to identify as a boy or a girl as he 
developed throughout childhood.165 
Over the next several months, M.C.’s team of physicians 
ultimately decided—without explanation—that he should be 
raised as a girl and assigned him the female sex by removing his 
                                                                                                                            
158. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 3 (specifying that M.C.’s specific 
condition is ovotesticular DSD). Medical records indicate that M.C. was born with a 
“rather large” phallus, significantly high testosterone levels, a vaginal opening below 
the phallus, and a “scrotalized labia.” Id. at 41. (revealing that M.C. was also born with a 
twin sister who died several months after birth due to complications from prematurity). 
159. Id. para. 3 (describing M.C.’s genitalia as stated in his medical records). 
160. Id. para. 38 (explaining that the State acted as guardian for M.C. during the 
time doctors treated his intersex condition). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. para. 42–46 . 
163. Id. para. 42 (detailing M.C.’s “ambiguous genitalia”). 
164. Id. para. 43 (noting that M.C.’s condition was impossible to determine). 
165. Id. paras. 43, 46. 
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phallus and constructing a hollowed vagina in his groin.166 On 
April 18, 2006, Dr. Aaronson, one of M.C.’s primary physicians, 
removed M.C.’s phallus and excised most, if not all, of his male 
reproductive tissue.167 Four months later, in August 2006, Pam 
and Mark Crawford took custody of M.C. and legally adopted 
him in December 2006.168 They then brought this suit on behalf 
of M.C. to “vindicate his rights” and speak out against the 
practice of genital normalizing surgery.169 
M.C.’s complaint alleges that the physicians and the social 
workers who consented to his surgery violated his “substantive 
due process rights to bodily integrity, privacy, procreation, and 
liberty, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.”170 He asserts that by assigning him a sex 
and selecting a gender for him, the physician-defendants 
“usurped . . . intimate and profound decisions from [him] when 
he was barely older than an infant” and that their actions 
“interfered with [his] future ability to form intimate, procreative 
relationships, choices central to his personal dignity and 
autonomy.”171 M.C. also raises a procedural due process claim 
that his rights to bodily integrity, privacy, procreation, and 
liberty were deprived because the physicians operated on him 
“without requesting, initiating, or inquiring as to a pre-
deprivation hearing.”172 The District Court Judge denied the 
                                                                                                                            
166. Id. para. 49 (pointing out that the doctors who decided M.C.’s sex proffered 
no specific reason for their determination). 
167. Id. para. 51 n.1 (noting that in 2001, a pediatric journal published an article 
written by the defendant, Dr. Ian Aaronson, which stated that “carrying out a 
feminizing genitoplasty on an infant who might eventually identify herself as a boy 
would be catastrophic.”); see Ian A. Aaronson, The Investigation and Management of the 
Infant with Ambiguous Genitalia: A Surgeon’s Perspective, 31 CURR. PROBL. PEDIAT. 168 
(2001) (contemplating the disastrous results that would occur from assigning a child to 
a sex that does not match their gender identity). 
168. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 17 (providing a timeline of M.C.’s 
custodians). 
169. Id. para. 12 (stating the Crawfords’ reasons for bringing this action as found 
in the preliminary statement); see also SPLCenter, The Crawfords Speak About 
Groundbreaking Intersex Case, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=0qH4P5PtC4w (explaining why M.C.’s parents filed this lawsuit). 
170. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 72, 74, 77 (listing M.C.’s specific 
constitutional claims). 
171. Id. at 9–10 (introducing the fundamental concepts of how genital-
normalizing surgery deprived him of constitutional rights). 
172. Id. at 82 (asserting violations of procedural due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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physician-defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified 
immunity on August 22, 2013.173 The Judge concluded that the 
doctrine of qualified immunity did not apply to M.C.’s doctors 
as government officials because they violated his constitutional 
right to procreation when they performed genital-normalizing 
surgery on him.174 The parties are currently participating in the 
discovery process as litigation for the Crawford case continues. 
E. Alternative Policies & Pragmatic Approaches 
Rulings such as Völling and The Decision of Y.Y. represent 
progressive attitudes toward recognizing intersex autonomy, but 
the judiciary is not the sole source for countries to expand rights 
of the intersex individual. Germany has taken the initiative to 
acknowledge the intersex community, and in 2010 charged its 
Ethics Council to develop an official position on intersex issues, 
including discrimination and living situations.175 In 2011, the 
Council announced its three main findings: (1) intersex 
individuals have a right to “physical integrity,” and genital-
normalizing surgery ought to be delayed as long as possible; (2) 
intersex individuals’ right to self-determination precludes 
parental consent to genital-normalizing procedures from being 
absolute; and (3) the rights to self-determination and protection 
from discrimination provide freedom for all intersex persons 
                                                                                                                            
173. See Crawford Order, supra note 153, at 1, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(explaining that the “doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 
performing discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known’”). 
174. Id. at 8–10 (concluding that because M.C. has an “absent uterus” and his 
doctors removed his male reproductive organs, the defendants violated M.C.’s 
constitutional right to procreation). 
175. An Ethics Council is an administrative body in Member States of the 
European Union that serves as a national platform for dialogue about medical, ethical, 
and social issues in the life sciences. Council Directive 2001/20/EC, art. 2(k), 2001 O.J. 
(L 121) (E.C.) 34 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. The German Ethics Council, established on 
June 8, 2001, “provides an umbrella for interdisciplinary discourse relating to science, 
medicine, theology, philosophy, and the social and legal sciences, expressing its views 
on both the ethical aspects of new developments in the life sciences and their impact 
on individuals and society as a whole.” Ethically Speaking, EUROPEAN COMM., Jan. 2007, 
at 28, available at http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/docs/
ethspeakweb_8_en.pdf; see AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (discussing efforts to 
promote the understanding of specific minority groups). 
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from being forced to choose for themselves a sex in the 
exclusive categories of the male-female gender binary.176 
The German government determined that hardships facing 
intersex persons is a social issue and implemented a practical, 
bureaucratic solution to remedy these problems.177 Germany has 
already seen results from its actions.178 In April 2011, a bill was 
introduced before the German Parliament calling for 
institutionalized education on intersex issues and a moratorium 
on genital-normalizing surgeries used to treat intersex infants, 
however, the legislation never passed.179 
A novel administrative approach to the protection of the 
rights of intersex individuals is found in Germany’s inclusion of 
an option for a “third sex” on birth certificates.180 This unique 
practice, implemented on November 1, 2013, promotes the 
autonomy of the intersex individual by departing from the strict 
legal recognition of only those who fit within the male-female 
biological sex binary.181 Further, New Zealand, Nepal, Australia, 
and Uruguay offer their citizens passports with a third gender 
option beyond the traditional male-female categories.182 This is 
another example of a mechanism outside of the judicial arena 
                                                                                                                            
176.  AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 85 (recalling the Council’s conclusions). 
177. Id. (noting the progressive measures taken by Germany’s government to 
bolster awareness and equality for the intersex community). 
178. Id. (following Germany’s rapid response to the rise in the awareness of 
intersex issues). 
179. Id. (discussing radical legislation that would enforce complete autonomy and 
consciousness of intersexuality). 
180. Eric Cameron, Germany Adds Third Gender Option to Birth Certificates, HRC 
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/germany-adds-third-gender-
option-to-birth-certificates (reporting another effort by Germany to depart from the 
convention of the strict male-female sex binary); see Jacinta Nandi, Germany Got It Right 
by Offering a Third Gender Option on Birth Certificates, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 10, 
2013, 6:30 AM, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/10/germany-
third-gender-birth-certificate (commenting on Germany’s implementation of a 
progressive policy on gender and intersex issues). 
181. See Cameron, supra note 180 (noting Germany’s progressive efforts toward 
accommodating the intersex community); see also AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84–
85 (2012) (encouraging other European nations to follow in Germany’s footsteps). 
182. Michael Bochenek & Kyle Knight, Establishing a Third Gender Category in 
Nepal: Process and Prognosis, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 11, 24–26 (2012) (discussing several 
national governments’ efforts to address transgender and intersex populations); see 
Zach Gordon, Nepal’s Third Gender and the Recognition of Gender Identity, THE JURIST 
(Apr. 23, 2012, 5:04 PM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/04/bochenek-knight-
gender.php (investigating Nepal’s protection of transgender and intersex individuals 
with its third gender category on official identification documents). 
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that countries can adopt to recognize its citizens who are 
intersex or otherwise gender-variant. 
III. DEVELOPING THE CRAWFORD RULE: IMPORTING 
AUTONOMY FROM COLOMBIA AND GERMANY 
Part III uses court decisions of the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia and Germany’s Cologne Regional Court to argue that 
the South Carolina District Court should hold in Crawford that 
genital-normalizing surgery violated M.C.’s constitutional right 
to liberty. Part III.A explains how genital-normalizing surgery 
implicates fundamental rights of the intersex individual by 
examining The Decision of Y.Y. and proposes a standard for 
evaluating M.C.’s constitutional claims. Part III.B then evaluates 
the best interests of intersex children by comparing the facts, 
holdings, and reasoning of the Colombia and Germany 
decisions to Crawford. Part III.C argues that the Crawford court 
should, in its eventual holding, establish broader protection for 
children with ambiguous genitalia than did Colombia’s holdings 
in The Decision of X.X. and The Decision of Y.Y. 
A. Constitutional Implications 
The Constitutional Court of Colombia’s opinion in The 
Decision of Y.Y. declared that when fundamental rights are at 
stake, a “constitutional dimension” arises on the issue of consent 
in the patient-doctor relationship with regards to genital-
normalizing procedures.183 The Court articulated that the facts 
of the case must be matched with the fundamental rights at 
issue—the right to identity and the right to develop one’s own 
person.184 The surgery performed on Y.Y. violated his right to 
self-determination because it did not allow him to “freely 
develop his identity,” just as the surgery performed on M.C. 
denied him the right to develop an identity on his own.185 
                                                                                                                            
183. Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995, 
Sentencia T-477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. , p. ) (Colom.), at 
10 (noting the constitutional interests at play for intersex individuals who face genital-
normalizing procedures). 
184. Id. at 14 (noting that the surgery that transformed Y.Y. into an anatomical 
female implicated constitutional freedoms). 
185. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (illustrating the right to identity’s 
interwoven relationship with the right to self-determination). See Crawford Complaint, 
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The German court in Völling held that the doctor deprived 
Christiane of her right to self-determination by taking away her 
opportunity to self-identify as a woman and violated her bodily 
integrity.186 This case suggests that a surgery that modifies an 
individual’s sex organs without their consent greatly affects that 
individual’s perception of their own biological sex, gender 
identity, sexual orientation, and procreative capabilities in a 
morally and legally unprincipled manner.187 The surgery 
performed on Christiane violated her right to self-determination 
because it did not allow her to physically develop as a woman, 
just as M.C.’s surgery did not allow him to choose to develop as a 
boy.188 
The Decision of Y.Y. and Völling are particularly similar to the 
facts in Crawford because Y.Y. and Christiane Völling brought 
their suits years after learning of their genital-normalizing 
surgery.189 Although Christiane Völling was not an infant when 
her physician operated on her, and Y.Y. was not intersex, the 
outcomes of these cases and the courts’ respect for the plaintiffs’ 
self-determination can be helpful in understanding the rights of 
M.C.190 Genital-normalizing surgery affects every intersex 
individual’s right to liberty, unless they gave consent to have the 
procedure performed.191 Parental fears and prejudices involved 
in the decision making process inevitably result in a choice to 
normalize the child as quickly as possible without a true concern 
                                                                                                                            
supra note 10, paras. 7–9 (asserting that the defendant physicians modified M.C.’s body 
to make it appear female by permanently removing his male sex organs). 
186. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the surgeon stripped the plaintiff of the 
right to freedom of choice as an adult to procreate and develop an identity as a 
woman). 
187. See supra Part II.B (analyzing in Völling the biological, psychological, social, 
and legal harms caused by a nonessential surgery that altered the plaintiff’s sex 
organs). 
188. See supra notes 141–144, 171, 174 and accompanying text (discussing 
Christiane and M.C.’s loss of procreative capabilities due to genital-normalizing 
surgery). 
189. See supra Part II.D (describing how M.C. sued his physicians at eight years of 
age for a surgery that was performed on him during infancy). 
190. See supra Part II (examining the Colombian and German cases involving an 
operation that assigned a sex to the plaintiff affecting that individual’s right to self-
determination); AGIUS & TOBLER, supra note 3, at 84 (highlighting the importance of 
the right to self-determination for individuals who are not allowed the opportunity to 
develop a personal identity). 
191. See supra Part II.C–.D (contemplating the connection between an individual’s 
liberty and that individual’s decision to surgically alter their genitalia). 
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for the best interests of the child.192 When parents discover that 
their child has ambiguous genitalia, medical professionals and 
parents undermine true informed consent by assuming that 
having the child’s genitals “fixed” is in the best interests of the 
child.193 
Current informed consent does not consider a minor’s best 
interests in the context of genital-normalizing surgery on 
intersex newborns, therefore the right to self-determination 
cannot be protected.194 Like the doctor who failed to inform 
Christiane Völling of her natural reproductive organs, M.C.’s 
physicians violated his right to self-determination by assigning 
him the female sex without his consent.195 Christiane Völling was 
not given the opportunity to learn she could live as a woman, 
and her physician stole her right to procreate as a woman with 
her natural reproductive organs.196 Genital-normalizing surgery 
likewise robbed M.C. of the opportunity to live naturally as a 
male and denied his right to procreate with his natural 
reproductive organs.197 
Genital-normalizing surgery tragically affected M.C. and 
infringed upon his fundamental rights at the tender age of 
sixteen months.198 Colombia’s ruling in The Decision of Y.Y. and 
                                                                                                                            
192. See supra notes 97–99, 145–147 and accompanying text (discussing the 
conclusions of The Decision of Y.Y. and the Völling courts, which found genital-
normalizing surgery to infringe on the individuals’ autonomy); see Tamar-Mattis, supra 
note 8, at 87 (noting that culturally-biased recommendations and medical professionals 
acting outside of their expertise contribute to a decision that does not concern the best 
interests of the child); Lee, supra note 26 (promoting immediate surgery in order to 
normalize the child). 
193. See supra Part II.A.2 (observing The Decision of X.X.’s discussion on parental 
prejudices regarding ambiguous genitalia); see also Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 86 
(explaining that genital-normalizing surgery is often presented to parents by doctors in 
a way that suggests the procedure is a foregone conclusion). 
194. See supra notes 59–62, 183–185 and accompanying text (showing that the 
standard practice of treating intersex infants does not consider the true best interests of 
the child because it still harbors Dr. Money’s flawed theory of psychosexual neutrality 
and aims to preserve social norms). 
195. See supra, Part II.B (recounting a genital-altering surgery that was kept secret 
from an individual as a violation of that person’s right to self-determination). 
196. See supra Part II.B (reviewing the Völling decision). 
197. See supra Part II.D (observing that physicians removed M.C.’s male 
reproductive tissue during the surgery that constructed his female genitalia). 
198. See supra Part III.A (discussing the constitutional implications of genital-
normalizing surgery and describing how the doctrine of informed consent fails as a 
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Germany’s Völling decision demonstrate how disambiguating a 
child’s genitalia and selecting a sex for them without their 
consent implicates fundamental liberty interests.199 These cases 
conceptualize the problematic nature of this medical practice 
and provide a standard for analyzing M.C.’s constitutional 
claims. Like the Colombian and German courts, US courts can 
examine specific issues which address the extent to which the 
surgery (1) violated M.C.’s right to self-determination, (2) 
precluded M.C. from developing an identity, and (3) was 
medically unnecessary.200 It is clear that no guardian can give 
consent for such a surgery without ignoring the best interests of 
the child.201 
B. Evaluating M.C.’s Best Interests 
Part III.B explores the constitutionality of genital-
normalizing surgery in the context of Crawford by analyzing the 
urgency of M.C.’s surgery and the degree to which it deprived 
him of his right to self-determination and to develop an identity. 
In Part III.B.1, this Note analyzes The Decision of Y.Y. and Völling 
and compares them to Crawford to evaluate the extent to which 
genital-normalizing surgery violated M.C.’s right to self-
determination. Part III.B.2 discusses the reasoning in The 
Decision of Y.Y. and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child to demonstrate how denying an individual the freedom to 
develop their identity violates their constitutional right to 
liberty. Part III.B.3 uses the holdings of The Decision of X.X. and 
                                                                                                                            
protection for one’s right to self-determination within the context of this medical 
procedure). 
199. See supra notes 171–178 and accompanying text (noting that invasive 
procedures that alter sexual organs implicate the right to procreate and the right to 
self-determination). 
200.  Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995, 
Sentencia T-477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. , p. ) (Colom.), at 
22 (analyzing the urgency, danger, and deprivation of fundamental rights to rule in 
favor of Y.Y.); see Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07, 
06.02.2008 (assessing the right to self-determination to conclude that the surgery 
violated Christiane’s fundamental liberty interests). 
201. Constitutional Court, Case T-477/95, (Colom.) at 14 (listing three factors 
that determine the limits of informed consent for genital normalizing surgery: 1) the 
impact of the procedure on the child’s current and future autonomy; 2) the urgency 
and importance of the procedure for the child; and 3) the age of the child). 
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Völling to argue that choosing a sex for intersex infants is 
unnecessary and deprives intersex children of their autonomy. 
1. The Right to Self-determination 
The Constitutional Court of Colombia protected the 
Colombian minor from the “invasive and risky” surgery after 
doctors refused to normalize X.X.’s genitals without her 
consent.202 The physicians in South Carolina did not exercise 
such caution in M.C.’s case and took action that immensely 
affected his best interests.203 Like the Constitutional Court in 
Colombia, courts in the United States ought to acknowledge the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which declares 
“[p]arents or . . . legal guardians, have the primary responsibility 
for the upbringing and development of the child. The best 
interests of the child will be their basic concern.”204 This 
principle emphasizes the rights of individuals too young to 
speak for themselves to be free from medical and parental 
intervention of their body.205 
M.C.’s doctors had no medical reason to operate on him, 
and performing an arbitrary sex assignment on a child that 
permanently deprives him of constitutional guarantees cannot 
be said to consider the best interests of the child.206 The 
defendants in the Crawford case violated M.C.’s right to self-
determination by denying him the choice to retain his male 
genitalia or to self-identify as an adult male with functional 
sexual organs.207 M.C. relies on the principle that liberty is 
                                                                                                                            
202. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123 (characterizing 
genital-normalizing procedures as dangerous). 
203. See Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, para. 5 (recalling that physicians 
removed M.C.’s phallus and male reproductive tissue); id. at 123 (classifying a 
procedure that “normalizes” a child’s genitalia as dangerous, greatly interfering with 
an individual’s body, and affecting the best interests of the child). 
204. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (presenting the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
205. See UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 102 (admonishing 
nation-states to look after minor children who cannot look after themselves). 
206. See supra notes 186–187, 190–191 and accompanying text (explaining that a 
medically unnecessary procedure that precludes an individual from constructing their 
own social and physical identity disregards that individual’s interest in his own liberty). 
207. See Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07, 06.02.2008 
(holding that the physician defendants violated the plaintiff’s right to self-
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intertwined with self-determination to assert that doctors 
violated his right to liberty and to bodily integrity by performing 
genital-normalizing surgery on him without his consent.208 
2. Developing an Identity 
In The Decision of Y.Y., medical professionals castrated the 
plaintiff just like physicians did to M.C.209 Y.Y. rejected the sex 
and gender assigned to him as he went through childhood, and 
as a teenager learned what was done to him as an infant.210 As an 
analogous scenario has played out in the United States, the 
District of South Carolina should examine the extent to which 
these surgeries affect individuals’ identities just as Colombia did 
nearly two decades ago.211 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child played a 
role in the Court’s analysis in The Decision of Y.Y. by conferring a 
duty upon Colombia to “respect the right of the child to 
preserve his or her identity . . . [and to] provide appropriate 
assistance and protection” when someone unlawfully interferes 
with particular elements or all of the child’s identity.212 Denying 
an individual the freedom to develop their identity violates their 
right to self-determination.213 By violating M.C.’s self-
determination, the physicians implicated his constitutional 
freedom of liberty.214 
                                                                                                                            
determination by permanently removing her female sex organs and taking away her 
free choice to self-identify as an adult woman with a female sexual identity). 
208. See supra Part II.C–.D (explaining liberty’s link with self-determination and 
reviewing M.C.’s procedural and due process claims against his physicians for violating 
his constitutional right to liberty and bodily integrity). 
209. See supra Part II.A, II.D (detailing the surgeries of M.C. and Y.Y.). 
210. See supra Part II.A (describing the torment experienced by Y.Y. because of the 
mismatch between his gender identity and sex). 
211. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
recognized the harms imposed on intersex children when their sex is determined 
without soliciting their input). 
212. See supra Part II.A (noting that Colombia upheld its duty conferred by Article 
8 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
213. See supra notes 171, 174 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the 
intersex individual’s fundamental rights to identity, autonomy, self-determination, and 
liberty are connected in the context of genital-normalizing surgery). 
214. See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text (explaining that self-
determination affects one’s identity, which is inherently tied to liberty). 
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3. The Timing of Surgery 
The Crawford court should import the analysis from The 
Decision of X.X. to hold that there is harm facing intersex infants 
because of genital-normalizing surgery that has no impact on 
the child’s health.215 The Colombian jurisprudence on this issue 
begins an analysis that lays the foundation for complete intersex 
autonomy by conceding that “parents cannot force their 
children to undergo risky surgeries or treatments that do not 
produce health benefits.”216 The tragedy that happened to M.C. 
demonstrates why the United States should use Colombia’s 
decision in The Decision of X.X. as an example to extend 
protections by recognizing the autonomy of intersex minors. As 
M.C.’s mother, Pamela Crawford, put it 
We feel very strongly that these decisions to permanently 
alter somebody’s genitalia and their reproductive ability for 
no medical reason whatsoever is an abhorrent practice and 
can’t be continued . . . . It is too late for our son . . . . The 
damage has been done to him.217 
C. The Crawford Outcome 
To interpret The Decision of X.X. as a clear victory for the 
medical treatment of the intersex community would be to 
ignore an important aspect of the decision—an aspect that still 
harbors the flawed assumption of Dr. John Money’s theory. The 
decision asserted that because X.X. was eight years old the 
urgent need for surgery was “eliminated,” therefore a genital-
normalizing procedure “represents a greater invasion of her 
                                                                                                                            
215. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting the lack of urgency and 
health benefits to individuals who receive genital-normalizing surgery). 
216.  Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU-337/99, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. , p. ) (Colom.) 68; see supra notes 104–
105 and accompanying text (discussing the Constitutional Court of Colombia’s 
recognition of intersex autonomy in the unique circumstances of genital-normalizing 
surgery). 
217. Jenkins, supra note 156 (quoting M.C.’s mother on thoughts about sex 
assignment procedures for intersex children). To hear M.C.’s parents discuss the 
lawsuit, see The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 169 
(spelling out the theory that children will successfully adapt to whichever sex is 
assigned to them as an infant because they are psychosexually neutral at birth). 
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autonomy.”218 The opinion suggests there can be instances when 
a parent gives valid consent to a surgical remedy of their child’s 
ambiguous genitalia as well as circumstances where it is 
impossible for a parent to give legal consent to genital-
normalizing surgery for their intersex child.219 This distinction 
between “true” informed consent and unconstitutional parental 
consent hinges on an inquiry the court examined but did not 
fully resolve: when is a parent’s consent to surgery as treatment 
for an intersex child invalidated by the autonomy of the child?220 
In The Decision of X.X., the Colombian Court found that 
postponing surgery did not violate the parent’s constitutional 
right to privacy of the home because allowing the child to 
develop a gender identity privileged “the minor’s autonomy 
within the home.”221 According to the Court, a child of eighteen 
months would not merit the privileges of autonomy within the 
home, thereby not securing the right to develop her identity and 
the opportunity to develop her gender identity.222 The Court 
makes the assumption that genital-normalization surgery on a 
newborn child is less violative of that child’s autonomy and right 
to self-determination because there is a possibility that the child 
will develop a gender identity that matches the genitalia chosen 
for them.223 It is a paradox to protect a child’s autonomy 
because that child can consent to medical procedures, while 
                                                                                                                            
218. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 88–90 (suggesting that 
parents can consent to genital-normalizing surgery for their children who do not 
understand the concept of gender but cannot for children who do understand such a 
concept). 
219. Id. at 86–89, 90–91 (purporting that an infant’s inability to give informed 
consent provides doctors and parents with the right to surgically choose a physical sex 
for the intersex child). 
220. Id. at 90 (inquiring “at what age can we presume the psychological changes 
have occurred that invalidate a paternal surrogate consent to treat the genital 
ambiguity of the minor X.X.?”). 
221. Id. at 87 (balancing the intersex child’s autonomy with the parent’s right to 
make decisions for their children). 
222. Id. at 88. (citing psychological studies that suggest at the age of five an 
individual completes the “preoperational” stage, where a sense of self has not fully 
formed, and develops intelligence and a sense of consciousness). But see Holmes, supra 
note 2, at 116 (arguing that this decision creates an arbitrary protocol for permitting 
potentially traumatic genital-normalizing procedures on infants while protecting older 
children from the harmful surgery). 
223. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 88–90 (exemplifying Dr. 
Money’s antiquated and flawed theory that children will develop genders which match 
their assigned genitalia). 
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proposing that the same protection from a forced, invasive, and 
unnecessary medical procedure should not extend to a child 
who cannot make medical decisions for themselves.224 
Sex assignment surgery on an infant employs the 
assumption that an immediate selection of a specific sex is best 
for the child, but it does not consider the devastating effect it 
might have on the child if the sex selection does not match the 
gender the child develops.225 The chances of forcing a child to 
live in the “wrong sex” are much higher when a sex 
determination is made at infancy than when a child has already 
created a gender identity, but the Colombian Court ignores this 
fact.226 A forced sex assignment surgery deprives an infant just as 
much of their autonomy, right to self-determination, and legal 
protections under the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.227 
The complaint in Crawford highlights the potential 
infringement of fundamental rights and detrimental effects of 
the current medical treatment for intersex infants.228 Such early 
surgeries undermine the intersex individual’s right to self-
determination and autonomy because the procedures disregard 
                                                                                                                            
224. See id. (reasoning that a child of five years merits more protection than an 
infant from a medically unnecessary surgery that potentially deprives the child of their 
rights to procreate, to self-determination, and to identity); See Holmes, supra note 2, 
116–17 (arguing that this decision only protects children whose genital ambiguity is 
discovered past the infancy stage where making competent medical decisions becomes 
more of a possibility). 
225. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 86–86 (reasoning that a 
sex assignment surgery on an individual who is aware of their body has the potential to 
proundly affect the individual’s identity without analyzing the effects of the same 
procedure on an infant). See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 71 (noting the inconsistency 
in a surgery that is performed in the best interests of the child yet has no empirical or 
anecdotal evidence to show the goals of such surgery are achieved). 
226. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 83 (assuming genital-
normalizing surgery constitutes a greater invasion of a child’s autonomy the older they 
are). But see Tamar-Mattis, supra note 8, at 65–66 (arguing that genital-normalizing 
surgery is never urgent—even at infancy. It is the parent’s discomfort and shock that 
their child is not normal, which creates the immediate need for sex assignment 
surgery). 
227. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 86–87 (declaring that 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires a child to consent for 
themselves to a surgery that alters their genitalia). 
228. See Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 9–10 (naming the issues of 
irreversability, privacy, dignity, autonomy, procreative relationships, and sterilization); 
supra Part III.A (considering the conflict between sex assignment surgery and 
fundamental rights). 
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the potential violation of fundamental rights.229 Colombia’s case 
of the minor X.X. and Germany’s Völling decision specifically 
protect the freedoms that M.C. claims he was deprived of by 
genital-normalization surgery.230 
When the policy from The Decision of X.X. plays out, 
parental decisions to use surgery as intersex treatment continue 
to implicate the child’s fundamental rights.231 The Court 
concluded that genital-normalizing surgery markedly affects a 
child’s best interests and is inherently unnecessary, but it does 
not explain why parental consent for the surgery sought on an 
infant is acceptable while it is not for an older child.232 The 
Court states a general principle that “[t]he rights of parents over 
their children are based only on their ability to protect the 
rights of the minor, so that the minor can develop as an 
autonomous person,” but it does not illustrate how parents 
consenting to a procedure that permanently alters their infant’s 
genitalia does not infringe upon the minor’s rights.233 
According to the theory articulated by the Court in The 
Decision of X.X., doctors can perform genital-normalizing surgery 
on infants like M.C. through informed consent from the minor’s 
parent or guardian because an intersex infant is a “developing 
autonomy” incapable of making competent medical decisions.234 
                                                                                                                            
229. Crawford Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 9–10 (alleging that the physicians’ 
and social workers’ actions “constituted an egregious, arbitrary, and enduring invasion 
of M.C.’s bodily integrity.”); see supra Part II.A–.B (discussing the deprivation of the 
right to an identity, autonomy, and the right to self-determination, in The Decision of 
Y.Y., The Decision of X.X., and Völling). 
230. See Kölner Landgericht [Cologne District Court], 25 O 179/07, 06.02.2008 
(concluding that a surgery which is medically unnecessary and affects intimate 
decisions such as procreation compromises the patient’s bodily integrity and right to 
self-determination); see also Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.) at 68, 91 
(concluding that genital-normalizing surgery greatly affects a child’s autonomy). 
231. Constitutional Court, Case SU-337/99, (Colom.), at 88–90 (suggesting that 
normalizing an infant’s genitalia when parents give “qualified and persistent” consent 
is constitutional). 
232. See id. (noting that since the plaintiff was eight years old the urgency of 
surgically determining her sex so she has the opportunity to identify with a gender that 
matches her genitalia had disappeared). 
233. See Translation of the X.X. Decision, supra note 107, at 123 (describing the 
detrimental effects of parents deciding to alter an intersex child’s genitalia but not 
applying this logic to intersex infants). 
234. See supra Part II.A (classifying infants as not completely autonomous 
individuals). See also supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
protection of a child’s right to freely develop their identity and choose a gender 
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This outcome is inadequate because it does not protect 
individuals like M.C., and to protect intersex infants’ 
constitutional rights, the Crawford holding needs to go further 
than the Constitutional Court in Colombia’s holding in The 
Decision of X.X.235 
The law must abandon the conclusion that children are 
psychosexually neutral and that genital-normalizing surgery on 
intersex infants is not a harmful procedure.236 Crawford presents 
the United States with an opportunity to denounce an unethical 
medical practice that is based on an incorrect theory.237 By 
modifying natural anatomy that has been deemed socially 
unacceptable, genital-normalizing surgery isolates individuals 
like M.C. who do not conform to the traditional ideas of male 
and female and violates their fundamental right to liberty.238 If 
M.C. prevails, a constitutionally protected fundamental right to 
liberty would protect all intersex individuals incapable of 
medical consent from the harmful and arbitrary practice of 
genital-normalizing surgery.239 
CONCLUSION 
The German and Colombian jurisprudence examined in 
this Note have set the tone for international human rights in the 
intersex context and can provide guidance for US courts, 
specifically in application to the Crawford case. The enactment of 
third sex categories on birth certificates and passports marks a 
                                                                                                                            
identity as long as they are of an age that allows them to make competent medical 
decisions). 
235. See supra notes 224–226 and accompanying text (examining the policy 
created by The Decision of X.X., which protects children who can consent to surgery but 
not those who cannot make competent medical decisions). 
236. See supra Part I.C (explaining Dr. Money’s theory that early genital-
normalizing surgery offers intersex individuals the opportunity to live a normal life 
because they can develop a gender identity to match the sex chosen for them at 
infancy). 
237. See supra Part II.D (revealing that AAP guidelines still promote early surgery 
to disambiguate intersex children’s genitalia). 
238. See supra Part III.B (analyzing the best interests of M.C. to show that his 
genital-normalizing violated his right to self-determination thereby depriving him of his 
liberty). 
239. See supra notes 202–203, 206–207, 230 (arguing that the best interests of the 
child do not allow for anyone to consent to genital-normalizing surgery except the 
individual herself). 
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movement away from the harmful male-female gender binary. 
This also encourages a delay in genital-normalizing surgery to 
allow all persons the opportunity to determine their own sex 
and gender instead of having a harmful sex determination 
forced upon them from birth—one which, may in fact, be 
inconsistent with their actual gender. The phenomenon of 
recognizing fundamental rights for intersex individuals to 
protect them from an ethically-flawed medical practice is on the 
brink of introduction into the US legal framework. The 
application of this progressive international thinking to the 
Crawford case would promote human rights and constitutional 
protection in the United States. 
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